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The economic effects of a Russia-EU FTA 
 
Miriam Manchin 
 
Abstract: The paper examines the effects of Russia joining the WTO taking into account 
energy sector reform and the impact of a future Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the 
enlarged EU and Russia. The paper uses Computable General Equilibrium Modelling 
techniques for quantifying the different possible scenarios. The scenarios include a 
standard assessment of the removal of tariff barriers including agriculture, services and 
removal of non-tariff barriers. The results suggest that a potential FTA would be beneficial 
for Russia only if it would incorporate not only reduction in industrial tariffs but also in 
agriculture and liberalisation in services.   
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1. Introduction 
Russia applied for WTO membership and started negotiations for its accession in 1993. 
Once a WTO member, a possible next step for Russia would be to join a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with the European Union. Due to Russia's geographic location and the 
importance of the EU in its external trade, accounting for more than 50% of its total trade, 
joining a FTA with the EU would be an expected next step. Both joining the WTO and 
concluding a FTA with the EU would imply reduction in trade barriers with changes in 
bilateral trade flows that would affect the Russian economy. This paper seeks to provide a 
quantitative assessment of the impact of the liberalisation of restrictions on trade on 
bilateral trade flows and its effects on the Russian economy.   
The possible impact of a FTA on the Russian economy will depend on the coverage of the 
agreement. A trade agreement may have broader effects than those resulting from tariff 
removal. A free trade agreement can affect a whole range of government policies, not just 
those applied at the border, that could have more important consequences for the domestic 
economy. If the Russia-EU FTA would only include reductions in industrial tariffs, the 
benefits for Russia are likely to be limited, since EU tariffs are already low on products 
exported by Russia (as shown in Brenton, Tourdyeva and Whalley 1997). On the other 
hand the gains for Russia might be large if the FTA stimulates regulatory reforms, 
reduction in barriers to trade in services and covers also agricultural products.  
In order to quantify the different effects of a FTA and WTO accession on the Russian 
economy, in this paper I define different scenarios. Due to data limitations and modelling 
difficulties the benefits from 'locking-in' domestic reform policies can only be proxied 
very crudely. Nevertheless, the paper seeks to quantify and compare these different 
scenarios using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. CGE models are often 
used for applied trade policy analysis (see for example Francois and Reinert 1997). These 
models can be used to assess the economic effects of different trade policies including 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The model used in this paper assumes perfect competition, 
constant elasticity of substitution preference functions for consumers and constant 
elasticity of transformation frontier for production possibilities in each region. 
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A few recent papers have also attempted to quantify the possible effects of Russia's 
accession to the WTO and a Russia-EU FTA. Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004) use base 
data from 1995 in a CGE model allowing for increasing return to scale to estimate the 
effects of the WTO accession. They analyse the medium run effects by assuming a 50% 
import tariff reduction and liberalization of FDI in the service sector. They find that the 
overall gains from accession amount to 7.2 percent of the value of Russian consumption 
(or 3.3% of GDP) in the medium run from WTO accession and up to 24 percent (11% of 
GDP) in the long run. Most of these gains originate from the FDI liberalization in services 
(70% of the gains). Yudaeva (2002) also argues that major effects of the WTO accession 
are expected to come from increasing market access to the service sector, while the effects 
of liberalization of trade in goods will be rather modest since major trade liberalization has 
already taken place in Russia. Contrary to these findings de Souza (2004) concludes (again 
using a CGE model) that WTO accession alone would have limited effects on Former 
Soviet Union (FSU) countries, while an EU-Russia FTA would yield potentially greater 
gains based on tariff reductions. Sulamaa and Widgren (2002) also look at the effects of 
EU enlargement and EU-CIS (Commonwealth of the Independent States) integration using 
a CGE model with 1997 as a base year. The model used in the paper, similarly to Souza 
(2004), does not include Russia as a separate region therefore no conclusions can be 
reached on the precise effects on the Russian economy. The paper finds that the impact of 
the Eastern enlargement of the EU has negligible impact on other countries while an EU-
CIS integration worsens welfare in most of the other regions with the exception of FSU, 
Finland and Germany. The findings suggest that for an EU-CIS integration to be beneficial 
it is required that productivity improvements take place in the CIS countries.  
In this paper we use an updated database which includes Russia as a separate region and 
that is based on production and trade in 2001. Moreover, based on recent developments of 
the negotiations of the WTO accession, we take into account an energy sector reform that 
largely changes the potential effects of the WTO accession. Furthermore, we combine the 
negotiated binding tariffs with updated tariff data that provide greater precision for the 
quantification of the effects. Finally, we investigate the effects of a deeper form of Russia-
EU FTA including tariff reductions not only for industrial products but also services and 
agriculture.  Moreover, we investigate the effects of possible regulatory reforms tied to the 
agreements.  
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The paper is organised as follows. The following section provides a detailed description of 
current trade policies both in the EU and in Russia and a brief description of the 
implications for the FTA. The next section explains the specification of the computable 
general equilibrium model. Section 4 then describes the different scenarios. The results of 
the simulations are presented in the fifth section. The final section concludes.   
2. Current trade policies and economic links between Russia and the EU1 
Trade policies in the EU 
Table 1 summarises the key features of EU (EU15 Member States and the ten New 
Member States separately) imports from Russia and the associated MFN tariffs in the 
common external trade policy of the EU. The table shows that the sectoral structure of EU 
imports from Russia is dominated by mineral products, and especially oil and gas, which 
accounted for 38 per cent of the total in EU-15 imports and 64 per cent in EU-10 imports 
in 2001. The other main sectors in EU-15 imports from Russia are other manufacturing 
products (18 per cent), other metals (8.7 per cent), steel (5.3 per cent) chemicals (4.8 per 
cent), agricultural products (3.8 percent), wood (2 per cent) and other machinery products 
(1.8 per cent). No other manufacturing sector comprises more than one per cent of the 
total.  
Thus, Russian exports to the EU are dominated by resource intensive products. This is a 
central issue for Russia arising from domestic reform, WTO accession and greater 
integration with the EU: the extent to which Russia evolves away from an economic 
structure dominated by basic commodities and resource intensive activities towards a 
structure based around a modern high value-added manufacturing sector. Economic policy 
in terms of trade policies, energy policies, policies towards foreign investment, the nature 
of standards and the standardisation process are all crucial in this context.  
                                                           
1 This section draws on a joint  paper with Paul Brenton entitled "Trade Policies in Russia and the EU with 
Implications for the Economic Impact of a Free Trade Agreement" prepared for the European Commission 
in 2001  
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The next two columns of the table show the trade weighted (using import values for the 
year 2001) average (MFN) tariff for each sector. This again reflects the dominance of 
mineral products where tariffs are very low. In addition, all the other key sectors in EU 
imports from Russia have relatively low tariffs. For coal, oil and gas the average tariff is 0 
per cent, for wood the average tariff in 2001 was 0.1 per cent. The average tariff for other 
manufacturing products is 1.9 per cent, for steel 0.9, for chemicals 1.5 per cent. The trade 
weighted average tariffs on textiles, clothing, processed food and motor vehicles are the 
highest (between 1.8 and 9.3 per cent in 2001), but currently these sectors together 
comprise only 2.4 per cent of total EU imports from Russia. The overall trade-weighted 
average tariff was 2 per cent in 2001 in the EU-15 and 7.1 percent in the EU-10 in 2001.  
Table 1 has shown the situation that would be relevant if Russia paid the MFN tariff of the 
EU. In practice in 2000 Russia was eligible for preferential treatment under the EU’s 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for certain products. Thus Table 2 extends the 
analysis by showing for each sector the amount of imports in 2000 which were eligible for 
GSP treatment and the amount of imports which actually received GSP treatment. The 
final row of the table shows that only a relatively small proportion (6.4 per cent) of EU 
imports of non-agricultural products were eligible for GSP treatment in 2000. This reflects 
that a very large proportion of EU imports from Russia are concentrated upon products 
that already enter the EU market with zero duties, where the GSP is not relevant. The 
Table shows that of imports eligible for GSP preferences about 50 per cent were actually 
granted preferential access to the EU. This is important since if the factors which constrain 
the full exploitation of the GSP remain under a free trade agreement then the impact of 
such an agreement on trade flows will be reduced.   
One of the main reasons why products may not receive preferential treatment is failure to 
satisfy the rules of origin which stipulate particular changes or processes that must be 
undertaken in the beneficiary country to confer origin, (see Brenton and Manchin 2003 for 
further discussion). This is likely to be an important issue in a free trade agreement 
between the EU and Russia if the rules of origin constrain the impact of trade liberalisation 
and domestic reform in Russia in stimulating industrial adjustment in Russia. This may 
arise since rules of origin tend to be more restrictive for standard and modern 
manufactures such as processed food products, clothing and engineering and transport 
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products than for basic commodities where origin is more easily established. In this 
context a quick integration of Russia into the pan-European area for cumulation would be 
important in allowing Russian producers to source imports from throughout Europe, 
including the CEECs and to integrate Russian producers into European-wide networks of 
production.   
Table 2 goes on to show the trade weighted average tariffs computed on the basis of the 
actual amount of imports which received GSP treatment in 2000 and the average tariffs 
that would have arisen if GSP preferences had been fully exploited in that year. This leads 
to a minor reduction in the overall tariff for non-agricultural products from 0.83 per cent 
with MFN duties (from table 1) to 0.77 per cent with actual GSP preferences and 0.68 per 
cent if GSP preferences had been fully taken up. The final columns of the table show a 
slight increase in the proportion of imports from Russia subject to zero duties and a slight 
decline in the share of trade subject to high duties of more than 10 per cent, once the GSP 
is taken into account. The overall trade weighted average tariff under the GSP excluding 
fuels was 1.86 per cent in 2000 and would have been 1.62 per cent if GSP benefits had 
been fully exploited. 
EU imports of steel from Russia, together with imports from Ukraine and Kazakhstan, are 
subject to quantitative restrictions. These are the only third-party countries to be subject to 
such restrictions. Many of the quotas applied to these countries appear to be binding, that 
is, actual trade is very close (more than 90 per cent) of the quota level. These quotas will 
be removed upon the accession of the respective country to the WTO. If there are different 
dates of accession to the WTO for these countries, the EU will have to consider the 
removal of all of the quotas upon the accession of the first countries to avoid potential 
trade diversion if the non-member countries remained quota-constrained. 
Overall, with very low tariff barriers in the EU against imports of industrial products from 
Russia the scope for trade diversion and trade creation in the EU appears to be very 
limited.  
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Trade policies in Russia 
Table 3 shows the structure of Russian imports from the EU and the average tariffs for the 
year 2001 for each sector and in total, weighted by trade values. In 2001 agricultural 
products (primary agricultural products, forest and fishery, processed food products) 
accounted for 16 per cent of Russian imports from the EU-15. Russian imports from the 
EU are dominated by other manufacturing products, which accounted for 37 per cent of 
the total. Other metals, chemicals, steel and clothing are also important sectors in Russian 
imports from the EU.  
The overall trade weighted average tariff on Russian imports from the EU-15 in 2001 was 
8.4 per cent and 8 per cent for the EU-10. High average tariffs, above 15 per cent, are 
apparent for processed food, wood and clothing. The table also shows that an important 
proportion of Russian imports from the EU were subject to high duties in excess of 10 per 
cent. 
By presenting an indicator of the similarity of the structure of Russian imports from the 
EU and imports from other trade partners we examine the potential for the preferential 
removal of tariffs in Russia against imports from the EU to cause trade diversion in 
Russia. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the values of the similarity index 
between the EU and different suppliers of imports to the Russian market in 2000. The 
highest degree of import similarity is between Russian imports from the EU and imports 
from the US. This reflects in part the importance of machinery in imports from both 
countries. High degrees of similarity are also apparent between Russian imports from the 
EU and imports from the Czech Republic and Poland. In the former case this again reflects 
the importance of engineering products, which accounted for almost 30 per cent of Russia 
imports from the Czech Republic in 2000. For Poland, however, the high value of the 
similarity index also captures in part the importance of agricultural products in Russian 
imports from both the EU and Poland. Due to the EU enlargement a free trade agreement 
between the EU and Russia will entail no discrimination between existing EU members 
and countries in Central and Eastern Europe and hence no scope for trade diversion 
between these groups of countries.  
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The figure also shows the relatively high degree of similarity between Russian imports 
from the EU and Russian imports from Ukraine. Thus, a free trade agreement between 
Russia and the EU could lead to significant trade diversion away from Ukraine in both the 
EU and the Russian markets. The impact in Russia may well be limited if Ukrainian 
products are of vastly different quality to products from the EU, thus reducing the degree 
of substitutability between products from these two countries in the Russian market. 
Nevertheless, this again raises the issue of whether parallel trade agreements with Ukraine 
should be investigated. 
So, high tariffs and a relatively high degree of similarity between imports from the EU and 
imports from other OECD countries suggest considerable potential for trade diversion in 
Russia away from OECD countries such as the US, Canada and Japan following a free 
trade agreement with the EU. If so this would have the standard negative impact on 
welfare from the economic theory of preferential trade agreements, which was briefly 
described in the introduction.  
Implications for a Free Trade Agreement 
The average tariff on EU imports from Russia is very low. Further, an important share of 
EU imports from Russia enters the EU at zero duty rates. Hence, it would appear that the 
removal of tariffs under a free trade agreement would not have a significant impact upon 
EU imports from Russia. Thus, there appears to be little scope for substantial trade 
creation or diversion in the EU market under a free trade agreement with Russia.  
This of course is based upon an analysis of current trade structures and it may be that a 
free trade agreement would encourage some diversification of the structure of EU imports 
from Russia towards products where tariffs are more significant, such as textiles and 
clothing. This will depend upon supply conditions in Russia and the extent to which EU 
trade policies are currently constraining imports from Russia in these sectors. Further, 
producers of products such as clothing may have difficulty in exploiting the benefits of a 
free trade agreement with the EU if factors which currently constrain the taking up of GSP 
preferences, such as the restrictiveness of, and costs of proving compliance with, rules of 
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origin, remain. Nevertheless, even a substantial proportionate increase in trade in these 
sectors will have at best a small impact on total EU imports from Russia and an 
insignificant impact upon the EU market as a whole. For example, in 2000 imports from 
Russia of textiles, clothing and footwear comprised 0.38 per cent of total EU external 
imports of these products. 
Thus, from the point of view of Russian exports to the EU, if a free trade agreement is to 
have a significant impact it will have to occur via mechanisms other than tariff removal. 
The key mechanisms which could contribute to a significant increase in economic 
integration between the EU and Russia are     
 The impact of a FTA on the extent and stability of the reform process in Russia. 
 The impact of a FTA on foreign direct investment in Russia 
 The extent to which a FTA addresses issues relating to technical regulations and 
conformity assessment although here again EU imports from Russia are currently 
dominated by sectors where technical regulations are unlikely to be barriers to trade. 
Thus, in the context of trade in goods a Russia-EU free trade agreement is unlikely to have 
a significant impact upon EU imports from Russia in the short-term. The impact of a free 
trade agreement will emerge in the medium to long-term by way of reinforcing market 
reforms in Russia, stimulating foreign investment in Russia and creating an environment 
through the adoption of modern European technical regulations and standards for the 
growth of technology intensive export orientated industries such as machinery. A suitably 
designed and implemented agreement could stimulate industrial change and adaptation in 
a similar way as has occurred in Central and Eastern Europe with flourishing two-way 
trade in engineering products and the increasing integration of firms from these countries 
into European-wide production networks. However, a key issue in this context is the need 
for energy reform in Russia. Subsidised energy prices will act to maintain an industrial 
structure biased towards energy intensive products. 
In contrast to the very low average tariffs in the EU, Russian imports from the EU face 
considerably higher tariffs. Thus tariff removal under a free trade agreement will have a 
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much more profound impact upon Russian imports from the EU. The scope for trade 
creation and trade diversion from the preferential removal of Russian tariffs on imports 
from the EU will be more substantial, although this impact may be slightly diluted if 
tariffs are reduced as part of the Russian offer to join the WTO and a free trade agreement 
occurs after WTO accession. Values of the similarity index (see Figure 1) suggest that if 
trade diversion does occur in Russia then it will most likely be at the expense of the US, 
Switzerland, Canada and Japan. There is a high degree of similarity between EU exports 
to Russia and the exports of many of the CEECs but trade diversion in this case will be 
avoided by accession. Similar reasoning applies to Turkey, which will also have duty free 
access to the Russian market if a free trade agreement is implemented.  
When levels of protection are not symmetric then the creation of a free trade area has 
important implications for the terms of trade. If a free trade agreement generates a significant 
amount of trade diversion, it will tend to improve the terms of trade of the parties to the 
agreement with an adverse impact upon the terms of trade of the rest of the world. A free 
trade agreement between countries with greatly differing tariffs can reduce the terms of trade 
of the high tariff country.2 For example, if a country with relatively higher tariffs forms a free 
trade area with the EU and generates significant trade diversion in favour of EU producers, 
the terms of trade of both partners with respect to the rest of the world will improve.  If the 
agreement leads to trade creation in the high tariff country there will be a decline in sales by 
local firms in their domestic market.  In the EU market, where tariffs are low, trade diversion 
and trade creation are less likely to be significant.  Thus, with no trade being created in the 
EU market, the decline in domestic sales by firms in the high tariff country may not be offset 
by a rise in exports to the EU.  Overall, the demand for goods produced in the high tariff 
country may fall and its terms of trade could worsen.  Note that in this case the EU benefits 
from an even larger improvement in its terms of trade. These potential adverse terms of trade 
effects for Russia would be reduced if a free trade agreement with the EU were accompanied 
by general external liberalisation.  
                                                           
2 Spilimbergo and Stein (1996) 
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3. Model Specifications 
The computable general equilibrium (CGE) model used for quantifying the effects of a 
Russian-EU free trade agreement is characterized by an input-output structure. The model 
used in this paper is the standard Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model which is a 
multi-regional model including links between households, firms and governments, 
incorporating links between different sectors.  
Production by firms in each region and sector is represented by a Leontief-type multi-level 
production function that involves value-added and intermediate inputs obtained from 
input-output tables. Each industry is assumed to produce a single homogenous product.  
Demands for primary factors and intermediate inputs are represented by a nested constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Intermediate inputs are either produced 
domestically or imported. Each firm uses a CES composite of domestic and imported 
intermediates. Domestic and imported goods are imperfect substitutes. The model covers 
all world trade and production and allows for two-way trade within product categories by 
treating the products of each region as heterogeneous based on the Armington-assumption. 
The model assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale.3  
Total regional consumption is represented by a composite regional household. Regional 
household behaviour is governed by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate utility function that is 
specified over composite government purchases, private consumption and savings. The 
current government expenditure proxies the welfare derived from the government's 
provision of public goods and services to private households in the region. Savings in the 
utility function proxies future consumption. The private consumption is derived from a 
Constant Difference of Elasticity (CDE) utility function, while government purchases are 
specified according to Cobb-Douglas preferences.  
Labor is assumed to be mobile across industries but not across countries. The global 
transportation sector intermediates between the supply of, and demand for, international 
                                                           
3 The algebraic form and theoretical structure of the model is described in Hertel and Tsigas (1997). 
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transport services. Furthermore, the global bank sector intermediates between global 
savings and investments. Technological progress is exogenously determined.  
The data come from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) version 6.4 (pre-release) 
dataset which is benchmarked to the year 2001. The data is aggregated into 22 sectors and 
13 regions (details on the aggregation are presented in Appendix 1).  
4. Policy scenarios 
EU enlargement 
In the base scenario we quantify the effects of EU enlargement on trade flows and 
production. The following scenarios are built on the results of this base scenario assuming 
that EU enlargement has taken place. This scenario assumes abolition of tariffs within the 
enlarged EU implying zero tariffs between New Member States and between New and Old 
Member States. Furthermore, the new Member States apply the common external tariffs of 
the EU vis-à-vis all third countries4.  
Russian accession to the WTO 
The second scenario examines the impact of Russian accession to the WTO assuming that 
the EU enlargement has already taken place. We assume that Russia reduces its tariff rates 
to the final binding levels (table 5 shows binding and applied tariff rates for Russia). For 
several sectors the final binding tariff rate is higher than the actual tariff rate therefore we 
leave these tariffs unchanged. The sectors where a reduction in tariff rate occurs are wood 
products, clothing, chemicals, motor vehicles and other transport products. One of the key 
issues in the negotiations of the WTO accession is the Russian energy price setting. It has 
been long argued by several countries that Russia has much lower domestic prices of 
energy that the world prices creating an unfair competition which should be eliminated 
                                                           
4 In the enlargement scenario the new Member States apply the same average tariffs for each product 
category as the "old" Member states towards Russia, further they apply zero tariffs towards Turkey with the 
exception of the agricultural products for which they utilize the "old" Members states average tariffs. 
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with the WTO accession. As a result, Russia agreed to increase domestic gas prices, 
therefore we assume according to the agreement reached between the EU and Russia5 that 
gas prices for industrial users will be doubled in Russia. Finally, to take into account 
liberalisation of trade in services, we assume that the ad valorem equivalent of restrictions 
on services will decline by 20 %.  
Russia-EU FTA 
The third scenario provides a detailed assessment of a Russia-EU FTA assuming that the 
eastern enlargement and the WTO accession of Russia have taken place. We consider 
three different forms of FTAs: (i) FTA with removal of tariffs on industrial goods, (ii) 
FTA with removal of tariffs on industrial, agricultural goods and liberalisation of trade in 
services, (iii) FTA with liberalisation of trade in services and goods with reduction in 
technical barriers to trade. Jensen, J., Rutherford, T. and Tarr, D., (2004) provide estimates 
for ad valorem equivalence of barriers to FDI in services sectors in Russia which ranges 
from 33% to 95%. As a crude approximation we assume that the ad valorem equivalent of 
barriers to trade in services is 55% in Russia and 5% in the EU prior to the FTA. Since 
these equivalent tariffs are measuring the barriers to trade in services they do not generate 
any revenues to the governments.  
Technical barriers to trade are difficult to measure directly. No precise measure of these 
barriers is available for us. To proxy the magnitude of technical barriers we define sectors 
where we expect to have higher technical barriers to trade. The EU has adopted different 
approaches for the removal of technical barriers to trade between Member States. The 
most restrictive approach covers products with important health and safety requirements, 
such as pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs etc, which products are expected to meet relatively 
more severe technical regulations. Other approaches deal with products for which safety 
and health concerns are not so important (see a detailed discussion on the importance of 
technical barriers to trade by product categories in CEC (1998)). We assume that products 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Finally, towards all other trading partners we assume a reduction of tariffs to zero on coal, oil, gas, 
electricity, natural gas, construction and services and a reduction of tariffs by 4% on all other products.  
5 See European Commission, DG Trade News Release, 21/05/2004, "Russia-WTO: EU-Russia deal brings 
Russia a step closer to WTO membership". 
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requiring harmonisation of regulations between EU Member States (most restrictive 
approach) face the highest technical barriers when traded between Russia and the EU. To 
proxy the reduction of these barriers due to regulatory reforms undertaken with the FTA 
we assume an ad valorem equivalent of 5 per cent on imports of primary agricultural 
products, processed food, chemicals, motor vehicles and other manufactured products into 
Russia, and 2 per cent into the EU. This is in line with trade cost estimates found by 
previous studies indicating that trade costs range from 2 to 10 percent of the cost of 
delivered goods (see further details on these estimates in Francois, van Meijl, and van 
Tongeren, 2003). 
Table 4 Policy scenarios 
Russia-EU FTA Enlargement WTO accession 
restricted 
FTA 
broad FTA broad FTA with 
reduction in 
technical 
barriers 
• New EU 
Member states 
join the custom 
union of the EU 
• tariff reductions 
according to the 
binding tariff 
levels 
• gas price for 
domestic users 
doubles 
• liberalization of 
trade in services 
(ad valorem 
equivalent of 
restrictions on 
services will 
decline by 20%) 
• removal 
of tariffs on 
industrial 
goods 
• removal of 
tariffs on 
industrial 
goods 
• removal of 
tariffs on 
agricultural 
products  
• liberalization 
of trade in 
services 
• removal of 
tariffs on 
industrial goods 
• removal of 
tariffs on 
agricultural 
products 
• liberalization 
of trade in 
services 
• reduction in 
technical 
barriers to trade 
 
5. Simulation Results 
Enlargement of the EU 
The impact of the enlargement on trade flows and production is presented in Table 6. 
While trade flows between the EU15 countries and Russia are only affected to a small 
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extent with the exception of the gas sector, Russian exports to the New Member States 
change importantly in several sectors after the enlargement. This is partly due to the 
limited similarity in trade patterns between old and new Member States and Russia (see 
Figure 1). As the New Member States reduce tariffs in several sectors with the adoption of 
the common external tariffs Russian exports to these countries increases in most of the 
sectors. The highest rise occurs in clothing products due to the reduction of the very high 
tariff barriers imposed on Russian products by New Member States prior to enlargement. 
Several other sectors also experience important increases in exports to the New Member 
States, such as coal, chemicals, steel, and other manufacturing products. On the other hand 
Russian exports of primary agriculture products and gas to the New Member States 
decreases by more than 20% as it is replaced with relatively cheaper EU products. 
Changes in production are limited under this scenario for Russia and the EU15 countries. 
For the EU10 countries production of steel rises by 10% due to the elimination of 
relatively high steel tariffs previously applied by the EU-15. On the other hand production 
of gas and oil decreases as it is replaced with gas and oil available at cheaper prices in the 
EU. As prices of these sectors decrease in the EU10 countries export of these products to 
Russia increases. The increase in the export is very pronounced, which is due to the very 
limited EU10 export of these products prior to enlargement.  
Russian accession to the WTO 
Table 7 shows two different scenarios. The first one includes reduction in industrial and 
agricultural tariffs and diminution of barriers to trade in services. The second table extends 
the first scenario with an increase in Russian gas price for domestic users. The changes in 
trade flows are less significant under the first scenario. The highest rise in Russian exports 
to the EU occurs in other transport vehicles and clothing products for which the increase is 
around 6%. The increase in the exports of chemicals, motor vehicles and other machinery 
to the EU is slightly smaller. Trade in services increases between the EU and Russia; 
while exports of services increase by 6%, imports rises by 10% for other services and 17% 
for construction services due to the reduction of trade barriers in the service sector. As 
Russian import tariffs are reduced for wood products the import of these products 
increases significantly. Furthermore, Russian imports of chemicals and motor vehicles 
also increase. Due to the reduction of tariffs in several sectors a small restructuring occurs 
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in the Russian economy. With increased imports of wood, clothing products and services, 
production in these sectors slightly declines and shifts towards other machinery, other 
metal and transport goods. On the other hand, production in other regions is only 
marginally effected as Russia joins the WTO. 
As gas price increases in Russia as part of the WTO accession the magnitude of changes 
both in trade flows and production are more pronounced. Drastic changes occur in the 
industrial output structure of the Russian economy with an important drop in gas 
production. The structure of the production shifts from gas, motor vehicles and 
construction services towards other sectors. The shift away from gas production evolves 
both towards modern high value-added manufacturing sectors, but also towards resource 
intensive activities.  The most significant rise occurs in production of other transport 
products, followed by other machinery, oil and clothing. For these sectors the increase in 
the production is more than 20%. These changes are also reflected by modifications in 
trade flows. The results show that doubling the gas prices for domestic users with 
important tariff reductions in certain sectors and liberalization in the services sector would 
imply strong changes in the Russian trade structure. Exports of all sectors towards the 
EU10 and EU15 countries rise significantly with the exception of electricity which drops 
by more than 30%.  
EU-Russia FTA  
The simulation results of a FTA scenario are presented in Table 8. The deeper is the FTA 
the higher its impact on trade flows and production. The smallest effects on trade flows 
occur with the scenario when only industrial tariffs are eliminated, nevertheless the 
changes are still pronounced. This scenario results in an important increase in trade of 
textiles and clothing products between the EU and Russia. Russian exports of clothing 
products more than doubles to the EU while imports of both textiles and clothing also 
increases significantly. The rise in clothing exports is accompanied with a more than 20% 
expansion of clothing production.  Imports of agricultural products and processed food 
products from the EU decline while Russian exports increase. Furthermore, Russian 
exports of gas decrease towards both regions and imports increase. Production of gas 
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increases in all three regions and the biggest increase occurs in Russia. Prior to the FTA, 
the EU tariff rate in the electricity sector was zero while Russia had a low tariff toward 
EU15 countries and somewhat higher tariff towards EU10 countries (around 3%). 
Therefore once these tariff barriers are eliminated, Russian exports drop by more than 
20% and imports increases by 14% from the EU15 and 33% from the EU10 countries 
which is accompanied with a small decrease in Russian electricity output. In most of the 
other sectors the impact of the FTA is higher on Russian imports than exports due to the 
low initial external EU tariffs and higher Russian tariff rates.  
When the removal of industrial tariffs is accompanied with the removal of agricultural 
tariffs and liberalization of trade in services Russian imports of agricultural products and 
services augment significantly. The changes are similar to the previous simulation results 
while the magnitude of the changes is bigger for most of the sectors. The Russian 
production shifts away from some of the resource intensive sectors, such as electricity, 
natural gas, but also from some sectors with more high value-added, such as motor 
vehicles and moves towards gas production and to a smaller extent textiles and clothing 
products.  
In the final scenario, when tariff removal is implemented with reduction in non-tariff 
barriers, the most pronounced increase in Russian exports occurs in clothing and textiles 
followed by processed food products. Trade rises compared to the previous scenario in 
primary agriculture products, processed food, chemicals, motor vehicles, other 
manufacturing due to important non-tariff barriers in these sectors prior to the FTA. Under 
this scenario the shift in production away from certain resource intensive sectors, such as 
electricity, natural gas, steel, other mineral products towards gas, clothing, textiles and 
other manufacturing products is more pronounced than in the previous scenarios.  
Welfare consequences 
Finally we compare the national income effects of the different scenarios. Income effects 
in the model are measured by the Hicksian equivalent variation (EV). This represents the 
income consumers would be willing to forego to achieve post-reform well-being compared 
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to baseline well-being at baseline prices. Figure 2 shows the income effects of the different 
scenarios for all regions. The highest income effects in Russia are achieved by joining the 
WTO and increasing the gas prices for domestic users. When comparing the different 
Russia-FTA scenarios the most beneficial agreement for Russia would be the deepest form 
of free trade agreement incorporating not only agriculture and services but also reduction of 
non-tariff barriers to trade. If the trade agreement would be limited to a reduction in 
industrial tariffs the FTA would not be beneficial for Russia. This is due to the fact that 
prior to the potential FTA the EU applies already low external tariffs thus this basic 
agreement would imply mainly reduction in Russia's tariffs towards the EU.  These results 
suggest that a deep FTA including not only liberalization of trade in services and tariff 
reduction in other products but also reduction of non-tariff barriers due to regulatory 
reforms would bring more substantial benefits for the Russian economy. All other regions 
with the exception of EU-15 countries, Middle-East countries and other European 
countries would loose from a Russia-EU FTA. The free trade agreement could be 
beneficial for the EU10 countries only if it is accompanied with higher regulatory reforms.  
Our findings are different from those found by de Souza (2004) who concludes that a 
Russia-EU FTA, which is limited to tariff reduction in the manufacturing sector, would be 
beneficial for all countries except Turkey.  de Souza also finds that Russia's WTO 
accession would imply a small welfare loss for Russia, Turkey, Finland, Hungary and 
Poland. His results seem to be partly due to the fact that under the WTO accession 
scenario he only considered tariff changes according to the agreed WTO tariff bindings 
and does not separate Russia from other FSU countries. His findings are also in contrast to 
the results of Jensen and Tarr (2004) who find that all forms of WTO accession would be 
beneficial for Russia. On the other hand Sulamaa and Widgren (2002) find that a FSU-EU 
FTA would be welfare worsening for all regions with the exception of the FSU (including 
Russia). These results are more similar to our findings, although we find that the FSU 
countries (not including Russia) would always loose from a FTA and Russia with the EU 
would gain only if the FTA would imply more than only elimination of industrial tariffs. 6  
                                                           
6 When comparing our results to those of de Souza (2004) and Sulamaa and Widgren (2002) one should keep 
it in mind that those scenarios were do not take into account WTO accession when estimating the effects of 
an FTA.  
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper, the effects of the EU enlargement, Russia's accession to the WTO, and an 
EU-Russia FTA on bilateral trade flows and production have been examined. A 
computable general equilibrium model was used to quantify the impact of the different 
scenarios.  
When examining Russia's accession to the WTO two different scenarios were considered. 
The first scenario assumed reduction in industrial and agricultural tariffs and decline in 
barriers to trade in services, while the second extended these with an increase in Russian 
gas prices for domestic users. The first scenario had only limited impact on trade flows 
and production structure of the Russian economy. However, doubling the gas prices for 
domestic users would have important consequences for the Russian economy. It would 
imply changes in trade flows and a drastic drop in gas production shifting the economy 
towards some higher-value added sectors while in the same time also towards other 
resource intensive sectors. 
The paper also examined three possible scenarios for a Russian-EU FTA. The results show 
that a key element of a free trade agreement between Russia and the EU will be the 
coverage of the agreement. If the FTA is not only limited to reduction in industrial tariffs , 
but also covers liberalisation of trade in services and regulatory harmonisation implying 
reduction in regulatory barriers to trade, benefits for Russia would be larger. This is 
particularly true if a FTA would be accompanied by domestic reform, with adjustment 
involving resources moving into more advanced sectors away from energy and resource 
intensive sectors. However, it is apparent from the results that an increase in Russian gas 
prices does not cause a shift away from resource-intensive production towards 
manufactures. A domestic regulatory reform is needed for a beneficial restructuring of the 
Russian economy. A free trade agreement can only complement the required domestic 
reforms.  
  
 20 
References 
Brenton, P and Manchin, M (2003) ‘Making EU Trade Agreements Work: The Role of 
Rules of Origin’, World Economy, May 2003, vol. 26, no. 5 
Brenton, P, Tourdyeva, N. and Whalley, J (1997), 'The Potential Trade Effects of an FTA 
Between the EU and Russia', Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 133, 205-225 
CEC (1998) ‘Technical Barriers to Trade’, Volume 1 of Subseries III Dismantling of 
Barriers of the Single Market Review, Office for Official Publication, Luxembourg 
Francois, J. F., van Meijl, H. and van Tongeren, F, (2003), Trade Liberalization and 
Developing Countries under the Doha Round, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 
2003-060/2 
 Francois, J. F. and K. A.  Reinert, eds. (1997), Applied methods for trade policy analysis: 
a handbook, Cambridge University Press: New York 
Hertel, T. W. and Tsigas, M. E. (1997), Structure of GTAP, in T. W. Hertel (ed.) "Global 
Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications", Cambridge University Press 
Jensen, J., Rutherford, T. and Tarr, D., (2004), The Impact of Liberalizing Barriers to 
Foreign Direct Investment in Services: The Case of Russian Accession to the World Trade 
Organization, The World Bank Working Paper 3391 
de Souza, L. V. (2004),  A Wider Europe: The Economic Effects of the Russian WTO 
Accession and the EU Enlargement, Paper presented at the World Bank's Annual Bank 
Conference on Development Economics in Europe, Brussels, Belgium 
 21 
Spilimbergo, A and Stein, E (1996) ‘The Welfare Implications of Trading Blocs Among 
Countries with Different Endowments’, Working paper 323, Inter-American Development 
Bank 
Sulamaa, P. and Widgren, M. (2002), EU Enlargement and the Opening of Russia: 
Lessons from the GTAP Reference Model, Keskusteluaiheita Discussion Paper No. 825, 
ETLA, Helsinki 
Yudaeva, K., (2002), Russia’s WTO Accession: Current state of Negotiations and 
Forecasts of the Effects, CEFIR, Moscow, Policy Paper 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 22 
Table 1: MFN Tariffs and EU Imports from Russia in 2001 
Sector 
 Imports Sector of sectors 
Weighted Average 
Tariff Tariff Revenue 
 EU-15 EU-10 EU-15 EU-10 EU-15 EU-10 EU-15 EU-10 
1 primaryagr 389.845 67.187 0.011 0.006 2.8 3.9 11.023 2.641 
2 forestsfish 550.097 42.047 0.015 0.004 0.2 0.4 1.099 0.149 
3 coal 142.065 78.403 0.004 0.007 0 8 0 6.275 
4 oil 7656.060 3868.344 0.209 0.367 0 7.7 0 297.892 
5 gas 6121.002 2852.910 0.167 0.271 0 5.1 0 145.084 
6 ominerals 160.715 187.817 0.004 0.018 0 6.6 0.026 12.469 
7 procfood 449.522 64.744 0.012 0.006 9.3 23.2 41.745 15.029 
8 wood 746.184 125.913 0.02 0.012 0.1 5.4 0.951 6.853 
9 textiles 144.498 71.722 0.004 0.007 7 11.2 10.171 8.019 
10 clothing 163.095 6.183 0.004 0.001 9.1 30.6 14.872 1.889 
11 chemicals 1737.790 668.312 0.048 0.063 1.5 7.1 25.41 47.752 
12 steel 1935.333 292.428 0.053 0.028 0.9 7.5 18.339 21.974 
13 othermetals 3192.751 262.399 0.087 0.025 2.3 2.9 74.731 7.527 
14 fabmetals 214.194 297.509 0.006 0.028 2.9 4 6.126 11.762 
15 motorvehs 130.169 61.205 0.004 0.006 4.8 5.5 6.297 3.338 
16 otransport 93.117 167.926 0.003 0.016 0 7.9 0.01 13.194 
17 omachinery 649.536 381.555 0.018 0.036 0.1 4.3 0.939 16.573 
18 omanufacts 6648.247 812.499 0.182 0.077 1.9 10.9 124.723 88.318 
19 electricity 92.104 21.327 0.003 0.002 0 4.3 0 0.909 
20 naturalgas 5.597 0.192 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 construct 80.679 4.560 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 
22 oservices 5251.447 205.051 0.144 0.019 0 0 0 0 
Total 36554.048 10540.234 1 1 2.0 7.1 336.462 707.649 
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Table 2: GSP Tariffs and EU Imports from Russia in 2000 
Sector 
 
Imports 
2000 
Imports 
Eligible for 
GSP 
Imports 
Receiving 
GSP 
Treatment 
Ratio of Imports 
receiving GSP to 
Eligible Imports 
 Weighted 
Average Tariff 
with current 
GSP 
Weighted 
Average 
Tariff with 
Full GSP 
Unweighted 
GSP Tariff 
 Share of Sector Imports 
with t=0 
Share of Sector Imports 
with t>10 
          Actual GSP Full GSP Actual GSP Full GSP 
Minerals 22680021 0 0 NA  0.11 0.11 0.00  97.08 97.08 0.00 0.00 
Pharmaceuticals 6012 0 0 NA  0.00 0.00 0.00  100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
Inorganic, Organic 
Chemicals and 
Fertilizers 
1748452 625975 219516 35  3.16 2.31 4.35  47.70 60.56 0.52 0.00 
Other Chemicals 114611 105874 53075 50  4.35 2.51 0.77  37.60 53.71 17.79 0.00 
Plastics 129284 88703 45847 52  2.79 2.12 1.72  61.57 66.31 0.00 0.00 
Raw Hides and Skins 206911 11926 6984 59  0.22 0.16 1.24  94.21 95.67 0.00 0.00 
Wood 1285452 156337 81625 52  0.70 0.57 0.96  88.15 88.43 0.00 0.00 
Wood Pulp 466816 246839 193326 78  0.39 0.01 0.11  88.57 99.82 0.00 0.00 
Textiles 122003 117220 90320 77  7.41 7.14 6.42  4.11 4.11 5.59 0.15 
Clothing 174928 174881 35631 20  12.33 10.81 10.21  0.04 0.04 96.78 96.77 
Footwear etc 5946 5962 3270 55  6.69 5.75 5.14  1.05 8.72 24.55 24.55 
Stone, Cement etc 25803 23891 10560 44  3.93 2.62 1.59  5.53 8.64 8.18 0.00 
Jewels 1973598 3250 0 0  0.00 0.00 0.10  99.84 99.99 0.00 0.00 
Iron and Steel 2081212 348027 288956 83  1.38 1.32 1.37  38.95 41.19 0.00 0.00 
Base Metals 4767361 0 0 NA  2.24 2.24 1.93  63.00 63.00 0.00 0.00 
Non-electrical 
Machinery 
244307 177243 91407 52  1.29 0.67 0.37  40.64 57.97 0.00 0.00 
Electrical Machinery 135404 102136 34607 34  1.52 0.70 1.10  47.44 60.15 0.26 0.00 
Motor Vehicles 55981 53440 18334 34  8.63 6.30 3.88  2.03 4.75 14.44 11.81 
Other Transport 
Equipment 
76620 23269 97 0  0.61 0.08 0.15  69.72 86.76 0.00 0.00 
Precision Instruments 36709 29688 3081 10  2.82 1.04 0.67  20.99 50.53 0.00 0.00 
Miscellaneous 
Manufactures 
65837 29932 11522 38  0.77 0.07 0.67  72.40 97.43 0.00 0.00 
Total 36403268 2324593 1188156 51  0.77 0.68 2.04  84.57 85.84 0.60 0.49 
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Figure 1: Similarity Between Russian Imports from the EU and Other Suppliers in 2000
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Table 3: MFN Tariffs and Russian Imports from the EU in 2001 
Sector 
 Imports Sector Share 
Weighted Average 
Tariff Tariff Revenue 
 EU-15 EU-10 EU-15 EU-10 EU-15 EU-10 EU-15 EU-10 
1 primaryagr 681.115 131.111 0.033 0.004 9.6 7.5 65.615 9.79 
2 forestsfish 13.056 5.217 0.003 0 9.5 13.2 1.241 0.687 
3 coal 1.763 1.722 0 0.009 3.6 0.1 0.063 0.001 
4 oil 53.715 22.894 0 0.421 0.1 0 0.042 0 
5 gas 1.279 0.000 0 0.205 0 0 0 0 
6 ominerals 68.258 5.705 0 0.018 5.3 5.1 3.634 0.293 
7 procfood 2397.021 435.404 0.124 0.021 15.6 15.2 374.233 66.291 
8 wood 829.306 97.358 0.003 0.01 18.4 18 152.964 17.504 
9 textiles 664.082 75.837 0.03 0.011 12.4 11.7 82.43 8.908 
10 clothing 715.021 66.579 0.044 0.003 19.6 18.8 139.912 12.517 
11 chemicals 3974.189 708.590 0.076 0.067 9 10.8 358.923 76.225 
12 steel 461.758 32.212 0.055 0.031 7.6 6.4 35.053 2.073 
13 othermetals 277.939 21.255 0.222 0.011 12.7 11.5 35.409 2.448 
14 fabmetals 677.004 96.528 0.018 0.017 14.1 14.4 95.461 13.869 
15 motorvehs 1881.792 264.527 0.019 0.005 13 13.9 244.015 36.698 
16 otransport 172.717 73.272 0 0.019 13.3 7.4 22.886 5.405 
17 omachinery 9036.961 660.822 0.003 0.023 7.7 8.4 693.944 55.775 
18 omanufacts 3028.759 552.890 0.371 0.125 12.7 11 385.658 60.821 
19 electricity 144.707 70.858 0 0.001 0.1 3.3 0.172 2.362 
20 naturalgas 147.403 39.944 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 construct 628.971 41.611 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 oservices 7832.248 416.026 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 33689.063 3820.361 1 1 8.4 8.0 2691.655 371.666 
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Table 5 Russian import tariffs 
 EU15 EU10 REUROPE TURKEY MIDEAST NORTH 
AMERICA 
SOUTH 
AMERICA 
ROECD EASIA SASIA FSU AFRICA Simple 
average 
Binding 
rates 
sim 9.6 7.5 4.7 7.9 6.1 6.9 7 8.5 8.6 5 0.1 5.7 6.5 25.2 
primaryagr 9.5 13.2 9.8 10.2 6.1 10.3 4.2 3.6 7.2 0.3 0 0.7 6.3 25.0 
forestsfish 3.6 0.1 0 0 5 0 4.8 0 4.7 0 0 1.6 1.7 5.4 
coal 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.2 0 0 2.7 0.6 5.4 
oil 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 4.4 0.4 5.4 
gas 5.3 5.1 3.8 5 5 5.2 5 4.9 10.3 5.1 0 5.1 5.0 5.4 
ominerals 15.6 15.2 11.5 16.8 13.2 21.4 31.8 16.9 14.7 12.3 0 14.8 15.4 25.2 
procfood 18.4 18 16.4 19.2 18.5 18.3 15 18.6 17.4 17.4 0 15.5 16.1 7.9 
wood 12.4 11.7 11.4 15 13.8 12.2 11.5 11.3 13.6 11.5 0.3 13.9 11.6 12.4 
textiles 19.6 18.8 19.7 19.8 19.7 19.9 12.9 19.6 19.8 19.9 0.2 17.6 17.3 12.4 
clothing 9 10.8 9.7 12 8.3 10.5 8.6 9.7 9.9 8.3 0 9.1 8.8 6.1 
chemicals 7.6 6.4 6.6 6.7 6 7.3 5.7 6.4 8.1 6.2 0 5.8 6.1 11.7 
steel 12.7 11.5 7.3 12.9 14.1 13.7 7.5 9.8 9.2 6.8 0 5.5 9.3 11.7 
othermetal
s 
14.1 14.4 12.7 15.3 13.3 14.3 12.6 13 14.7 13.5 0 11.9 12.5 20.0 
fabmetals 13 13.9 6.6 12.6 6.6 9.8 7.3 14 8.4 7.4 0 13.4 9.4 8.8 
motorvehs 13.3 7.4 7.5 10.7 15.2 14.8 13.3 7.9 13.1 16.8 0 11.6 11.0 8.8 
otransport 7.7 8.4 8.8 11 8.8 8.7 9.5 9 9.6 8.6 0 9 8.3 8.8 
omachiner
y 
12.7 11 14.8 17 12.2 12.1 7.1 11.6 21.2 13.6 0.3 14.4 12.3 16.4 
omanufact
s 
0.1 3.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0.4 5.4 
electricity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 5.4 
naturalgas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 
construct 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
Our data on final binding tariff rates by sectors originates from www.wto.ru. 
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Table 6 Impact of the Eastern enlargement of the EU (% changes) 
 
 
Russian exports to Russian imports 
from industry output 
sim EU15 EU10 EU15 EU10 RUSSIA EU15 EU10 
primaryagr -1.46 -21.17 0.49 1.41 -0.07 0.15 -0.02 
forestsfish -0.45 -5.6 0.24 0.32 -0.12 0 -0.35 
coal -1.7 34.21 2.96 3.74 0.42 -0.14 -1.43 
oil -2.78 11.09 2.34 37.06 0.45 -0.16 -10.53 
gas -3.66 -28.32 39.18 440.32 -0.45 -0.65 -18.43 
ominerals -0.37 8.74 0.39 -0.54 0.1 -0.08 1.27 
procfood -2.73 8.6 0.37 3.77 -0.13 0.03 1.65 
wood -0.68 18.15 0.54 -0.37 0.28 0.14 -1.71 
textiles -0.91 7.14 0.55 3.88 0.13 0.03 -1.93 
clothing -0.82 195.45 0.25 0.54 0.49 0.17 -1.96 
chemicals -0.83 26.13 0.45 1.27 0.61 -0.01 -1.33 
steel -3.02 33.65 1.18 1.74 0.03 -0.73 9.95 
othermetals -0.96 -8.12 0.62 -0.5 -0.79 0.12 -1.75 
fabmetals -0.93 -4.29 0.79 -2.07 -0.34 0.15 -2.24 
motorvehs -1.26 -19.7 0.11 7.66 -0.22 -0.01 2.85 
otransport -1.38 45.19 0.71 4.77 0.68 -0.14 -1.01 
omachinery -1.2 21.55 0.33 3.54 0.45 -0.13 1.19 
omanufacts -1.32 42.82 0.48 3.64 0.29 0.01 -0.33 
electricity -0.5 17.85 0.25 2.49 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 
naturalgas -0.61 -0.1 0.42 -0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.09 
construct -0.56 3.44 0.32 -1.89 -0.02 -0.02 2.6 
oservices -0.52 1.53 0.32 -3.72 -0.01 0.01 -0.45 
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Table 7 Impact of Russia's accession to the WTO (% changes) 
 
without oil price increase 
 Russian exports to Russian imports from industry output 
 EU15 EU10 EU15 EU10 RUSSIA EU15 EU10 
primaryagr -0.37 -0.35 1.16 1.13 0.98 0 0 
forestsfish 0.68 0.62 0.44 0.43 0.31 0.01 0.01 
coal -1.08 -1.02 1.69 1.66 0.91 -0.02 -0.02 
oil -0.34 -0.15 0.95 0.95 0.55 -0.01 0.11 
gas -1.84 -1.08 2.07 3.01 0.19 0.35 1.24 
ominerals 0.28 0.23 1.27 1.28 1.73 -0.05 -0.1 
procfood 2.49 2.47 0.16 0.11 1.39 0 -0.01 
wood 3.92 3.81 26.04 22.63 -3.38 0.14 0.07 
textiles 4.9 4.88 0.21 0.18 1.37 -0.01 -0.06 
clothing 6.3 6.28 5.11 0.16 -1.08 0.02 -0.05 
chemicals 4.86 4.75 3.45 14.69 0.83 -0.01 0.2 
steel 2.44 2.39 -0.05 -0.09 1.88 -0.08 -0.15 
othermetals 3.75 3.75 0.97 0.88 3.26 -0.2 -0.24 
fabmetals 3.87 3.69 -0.36 -0.42 1.81 -0.02 -0.09 
motorvehs 5.45 5.4 9.85 14.86 0.48 0.03 0.11 
otransport 6.38 6.16 22.05 -13.53 2.43 -0.03 -0.27 
omachinery 4.79 4.75 0.47 0.43 3.28 -0.03 -0.07 
omanufacts 2.59 2.38 -0.26 -0.31 1.18 -0.03 -0.07 
electricity 0.16 0.17 1.01 0.95 1.06 -0.01 -0.03 
naturalgas 2.45 2.51 -0.01 -0.1 0.95 -0.01 -0.07 
construct 3.04 3.08 17.45 17.4 1.04 0 0.03 
oservices 5.86 5.9 9.65 9.58 -1.12 0.01 0.01 
 
with gas price increase 
 Russian exports to Russian imports from industry output 
 EU15 EU10 EU15 EU10 RUSSIA EU15 EU10 
primaryagr 29.22 27.72 -1.24 -0.63 12.93 -0.15 0.06 
forestsfish 23.62 22.47 0.19 -0.26 15.82 -0.16 -0.48 
coal 32.44 28.85 -7.6 -7.16 13.91 -0.13 -0.56 
oil 47.49 6.75 -6.9 -0.22 22.93 -2.28 -13.61 
gas -0.23 19.53 961.35 9.79 -106.94 -2.04 3.97 
ominerals 12.75 10.73 0.58 0.65 11 -0.32 -0.69 
procfood 40.46 39.59 -2.86 -2.88 17.93 -0.06 -0.01 
wood 45.02 43.57 12.28 9.21 17.87 -0.08 -0.55 
textiles 38.4 38.24 6.52 6.51 21.2 -0.08 -0.19 
clothing 48.34 48.23 11.12 5.66 21.91 0.01 -0.24 
chemicals 30.38 28.99 5.83 17.41 19.09 -0.1 -0.05 
steel 20.87 20.19 -9.5 -9.28 13.02 -0.52 -0.72 
othermetals 18.81 18.23 1.28 1.37 15.03 -0.92 -0.97 
fabmetals 29.21 27.43 -3.54 -3.73 13.36 0.07 -0.32 
motorvehs 44.02 43.15 -14.97 -11.07 -7.05 0.09 0.03 
otransport 80.61 74.43 -15.13 -39.69 29.19 -0.21 -1.16 
omachinery 38.37 37.73 -6.33 -6.46 24.98 0.13 -0.07 
omanufacts 45.98 39.69 -10.44 -8.65 16.12 -0.32 0.09 
electricity -31.9 -32.34 29.94 30.9 9.93 -0.05 0.26 
naturalgas 55.02 55.6 -10.8 -11.08 8.03 -0.15 -0.56 
construct 35.63 35.81 -28.52 -28.53 -24.45 0.32 0.46 
oservices 39.71 40.04 6.58 6.26 8.65 0.01 0.06 
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Table 8 Impact of FTA  
 
removal of industrial tariffs  
 Russian exports to Russian imports from industry output 
 EU15 EU10 EU15 EU10 RUSSIA EU15 EU10 
primaryagr 5.47 5.09 -1.34 -1.16 0.46 -0.05 -0.03 
forestsfish 4.61 4.13 -2.03 -1.66 1.69 -0.07 -0.01 
coal 9.31 8.15 15.18 -6.16 0.34 -0.17 -0.03 
oil 5.72 0.48 -2.32 -0.53 3.03 -0.18 -0.61 
gas -61.39 -25.32 110.84 82.33 178.88 14.24 48.72 
ominerals 3.21 2.6 6.44 6.24 -0.24 -0.05 -0.2 
procfood 9.05 8.72 -3.86 -3.76 1.69 -0.05 -0.08 
wood 9.56 9.17 16.64 16.86 0.94 0.01 0.04 
textiles 94.34 92.99 71.34 64.47 11.4 0.21 0.37 
clothing 129.67 128.15 67.93 68.61 23.05 0.3 0.33 
chemicals 12.39 12.11 21.18 20.46 -0.11 0.05 -0.03 
steel 4.19 4.09 40.63 31.32 -1.24 0.05 -0.28 
othermetals 13.92 13.71 120.74 101.11 -0.98 0.05 -0.23 
fabmetals 25.59 24.56 60.75 63.45 -3.24 0.12 0.05 
motorvehs 49.5 49.16 19.76 19.93 -2.53 0.02 0.19 
otransport 26.34 24.43 51.91 36.26 13.25 -0.28 -0.15 
omachinery 9.79 9.64 23.2 30.95 -1.97 0.1 0.33 
omanufacts 21.4 19.83 48.99 35.9 2.61 -0.06 0 
electricity -23.77 -21.92 13.86 33.53 -1.11 -0.01 0.35 
naturalgas -0.04 1.15 -0.79 -3.44 -1.16 0.02 -1.61 
construct 10.2 10.11 -10.49 -10.37 -4.75 0.03 0.01 
oservices 9.25 9.21 -3.71 -3.64 0.91 -0.02 -0.04 
 
removal of industrial, agricultural tariffs and trade liberalisation in services 
 Russian exports to Russian imports from industry output 
 EU15 EU10 EU15 EU10 RUSSIA EU15 EU10 
primaryagr 22.36 22.26 46 31.72 1.39 0.07 0.14 
forestsfish 6.48 5.88 29.8 47.73 3.09 -0.13 -0.06 
coal 9.89 8.97 15.51 -6.07 1.23 -0.36 -0.19 
oil 6.26 0.34 -1.68 0.59 4.17 -0.45 -0.77 
gas -73.4 -31.34 169.97 105.71 225.55 17.41 60.93 
ominerals 4.12 3.43 6.87 6.69 0.79 -0.25 -0.49 
procfood 82.66 81.8 62.59 59.89 2.66 0.13 0.26 
wood 14.52 13.97 16.36 16.51 4.35 -0.13 -0.22 
textiles 109.57 108.07 73.07 66.09 15.96 -0.11 0.04 
clothing 148.17 146.49 69.55 70.22 28.86 0.07 0.05 
chemicals 14.92 14.65 21.27 20.23 1.6 -0.18 -0.37 
steel 5.18 5.12 41.24 31.56 -0.27 -0.22 -0.7 
othermetals 14.24 14.28 121.58 101.46 -0.5 -0.4 -0.71 
fabmetals 28.25 27.13 61.66 64.13 -1.6 -0.04 -0.2 
motorvehs 59.9 59.25 18.05 18.26 -0.41 -0.11 0.09 
otransport 37.43 34.4 47.9 32.87 19.55 -0.86 -0.69 
omachinery 13.66 13.51 23.86 31.61 0.74 -0.24 0.01 
omanufacts 26 23.99 47.96 34.9 4.44 -0.21 -0.19 
electricity -29.21 -26.92 19.17 38.89 -0.43 -0.08 0.32 
naturalgas 1.54 3.16 -0.27 -3.68 -0.44 -0.01 -2.1 
construct 31.61 31.5 66.24 66.46 -4.82 0.12 0.08 
oservices 35.85 35.87 84.72 84.85 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 30 
 
removal of industrial, agricultural tariffs, trade liberalisation in services and reduction 
in NTBs 
 Russian exports to Russian imports from industry output 
 EU15 EU10 EU15 EU10 RUSSIA EU15 EU10 
primaryagr 32.29 32.33 68.74 51.86 1.21 0.13 0.21 
forestsfish 6.04 5.42 29.91 47.81 2.9 -0.13 -0.07 
coal 10.13 9.2 14.73 -6.8 1.01 -0.4 -0.27 
oil 4.89 0.03 -0.48 1.57 4.26 -0.48 -0.47 
gas -73.82 -32.36 185.08 105.6 226.93 17.68 62.21 
ominerals 3.94 3.27 6.25 6.05 0.07 -0.28 -0.53 
procfood 98.91 98.01 82.6 79.32 1.93 0.19 0.36 
wood 13.11 12.6 17.44 17.49 3.69 -0.13 -0.28 
textiles 112.11 110.48 73.15 66.12 16.6 -0.15 -0.04 
clothing 148.32 146.73 70.11 70.66 28.97 0.05 -0.03 
chemicals 29.02 28.2 33.57 32.4 1.36 -0.17 -0.28 
steel 3.83 3.78 41.46 31.64 -1.24 -0.21 -0.75 
othermetals 12.41 12.46 119.96 99.7 -1.87 -0.37 -0.77 
fabmetals 26.04 25.13 62.04 64.25 -2.61 -0.04 -0.25 
motorvehs 74.21 73.46 31.42 31.59 -1.26 -0.07 0.15 
otransport 35.13 32.34 49.89 34.48 18.45 -0.89 -0.75 
omachinery 11.82 11.71 24.3 31.93 -0.59 -0.27 -0.09 
omanufacts 37.89 35.29 66.36 51.57 5.48 -0.27 -0.31 
electricity -30.06 -27.75 19.67 39.18 -0.7 -0.09 0.29 
naturalgas -0.56 1.15 0.66 -2.97 -0.72 0 -2.2 
construct 30.93 30.9 69.67 69.78 -3.46 0.13 0.11 
oservices 34.88 34.93 85.71 85.66 0.07 0.04 0.04 
 
 31 
Figure 2. National Income Effects (based on equivalent variations) 
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Appendix I. 
 
Regions of the model:  
RUSSIA RUSSIA 
EU15 "Old" EU Member States 
EU10 "New" EU Member States 
REUROPE other Western European countries 
TURKEY TURKEY 
MIDEAST Middle East countries 
NAMERICA North America 
SAMERICA South America 
ROECD Rest of OECD countries 
EASIA East Asia 
SASIA South Asia 
FSU Former Soviet Union countries 
AFRICA AFRICA 
 
 
Sectors of the model: 
 
primaryagr primary agricultural products 
forestsfish forestry and fishery 
coal coal 
oil oil 
gas gas 
ominerals other mineral products 
procfood processed food 
wood wood 
textiles textiles 
clothing clothing 
chemicals chemicals 
steel steel 
othermetals other metals 
fabmetals fabricated metals 
motorvehs motor vehicles 
otransport other transport 
omachinery other machinery 
omanufacts other manufacturing products 
electricity electricity 
naturalgas natural gas 
construct construction 
oservices other services 
 
